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Australia’s flawed Regulatory Impact Statement
(RIS) process
Sue Taylor, Julie-Anne Tarr and Anthony Asher*
Since 1985 a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) has been mandatory for all
Cabinet submissions and applies to every government agency operating
under the PGPA Act 2013. This “systematic approach to critically assessing
the positive and negative aspects of proposed and existing regulations and
non-regulatory alternatives”, when supported by a cost/benefit analysis, is
intended to mitigate unintended consequences and subsequent revisions
needs. As Federal Government agencies, such as the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority, operate outside direct parliamentary oversight it also
constitutes a protective mechanism against agency capture risk. Efficacy
concerns arise, however, through extensive (bi-partisan) use of carve-outs,
election promises and Prime Ministerial exemptions. This article highlights the
impact of non-adherence to the RIS process in three cases: establishment of
the National Broadband Network, the introduction of the Registrable Superan-
nuation Entity (RSE) licensing regime and the establishment of the Future of
Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms – and considers more broadly the ramifica-
tions of discretionary by-pass provisions.
The Australian Government Guide to Regulation1 states as follows:
This Guide has been written to help policy makers see regulation in a new light. The Government’s
rigorous approach to policy making seeks to ensure that regulation is never adopted as the default
solution, but rather introduced as a means of last resort. Regulation can have benefits, but businesses,
community organisations and families pay the price of poor regulation. Regulation can’t eliminate every
risk, nor should it. We therefore seek better regulation, not more regulation. Policy makers must seek
practical solutions, balancing risk with the need for regulatory frameworks that support a stronger, more
productive and diverse economy where innovation, investment and jobs are created. With this new
approach, stakeholders can look forward to a future with substantially less red tape and Australia’s
economy continuing to grow and prosper.
REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT (RIS) – THE FRAMEWORK
The updated Australian Government Guide to Regulation (AGGR)2 sets out an approach to regulation
which focuses on reducing the regulatory burden by cutting existing red tape and limiting the flow of
new regulation. Within this context, regulation is defined as “any rule endorsed by government where
there is an expectation of compliance”.3 The intent is to reinforce the existing requirement that every
policy proposal designed to introduce or abolish regulation must be accompanied by an Australian
Government Regulation Impact Statement or RIS.4 This approach has been the subject of bipartisan
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1 Statement by the Honourable Josh Frydenberg MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (March 2014) 3.
2 Australian Government, Guide to Regulation (Cutting Red Tape, March 2014). See <https://cuttingredtape.gov.au>.
3 Australian Government, n 2, Guide to Regulation, 3.
4 There are three RIS types: Long form, Standard Form and Short Form. These are detailed in the Australian Government, n 2,
Guide to Regulation, 11-12. At its most comprehensive, a Long Form RIS is required when a policy proposal has substantial or
widespread impact on the economy; the proposed changes affect a large number of businesses, community organisations or
individuals; the administrative and compliance costs are high or onerous; there may be determined opposition among
stakeholders or the public; the issue is sensitive, contested and may attract media attention.
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government approval in Australia since 1985.5 A RIS is defined at the OECD level as a “systematic
approach to critically assessing the positive and negative aspects of proposed and existing regulations
and non-regulatory alternatives”.6
As a consequence, if an Australian Government agency has a policy proposal with potentially
substantial or widespread impact on the economy, a detailed RIS is required. This RIS should contain:
• answers to the seven RIS questions;7
• analysis of genuine and practical policy options;
• analysis of the likely regulatory impact;
• evidence of appropriate public consultation;
• a formal cost-benefit analysis; and
• a detailed presentation of regulatory costings and offsets.
This RIS must be developed early in the policy-making process as a tool designed to encourage
rigour, innovation and better policy outcomes from the beginning. The Office of Best Practice
Regulation (OBPR)8 has been delegated the role of reviewing the RIS process for each policy change.
The RIS process is mandatory for all Cabinet submissions and applies to every government
agency including: government departments; statutory authorities; boards (even if it has statutory
independence); and public entities operating under the Public Governance, Performance and
Accountability Act 2013. The AGGR also highlights9 that even if a decision is not going to Cabinet, a
RIS is still required where the policy proposal is likely to have a measurable impact on business,
community organisations or individuals. This includes new regulations, amendments to existing
regulations and, in some cases, regulations subject to “sunset” provisions being remade.
To be assessed as adequate by the OBPR, a RIS must have a degree of detail and depth of
analysis that is commensurate with the magnitude of the problem and the size of the potential impact
of the proposal. Subject to this principle, the criteria which will be used by the OBPR to assess
whether a RIS contains an adequate level of information and analysis include the requirements that the
RIS should identify a range of alternative options including, as appropriate, non-regulatory,
self-regulatory and co-regulatory options.10
The only exceptions to these rules, which are set out in the AGGR,11 are designated “special
cases” which include:
1) Prime Minister’s Exemptions: The Prime Minister can exempt a government entity from the need
to complete a RIS when: there are truly urgent and unforeseen events requiring a decision before
an adequate regulatory impact assessment can be undertaken; or where there is a matter of Budget
or other sensitivity and the development of a RIS could compromise confidentiality and cause
5 As highlighted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform:
Australia – Towards a Seamless National Economy (2010) 99: “in 1985 Australia was already one of only eight OECD countries
with a formal requirement for regulatory impact analysis”.
6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Regulatory Policy in Perspective: A Reader’s
Companion to the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 (28 October 2015) <http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/governance/regulatory-policy-in-perspective_9789264241800-en# page2>.
7 Australian Government, n 2, Guide to Regulation, 8, 15-32. The questions are: (1) What is the policy problem you are trying
to solve?; (2) Why is Government action needed?; (3) What policy options are you considering?; (4) What is the likely net
benefit of each option?; (5) Who will you consult and how will you consult them?; (6) What is the best option from those you
have considered?; (7) How will you implement and evaluate your chosen option?
8 Located in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
9 Australian Government, n 2, Guide to Regulation, 9.
10 See Appendix 1 below in this article for a stylised schematic of the Regulatory Impact Statement Process.
11 Australian Government, n 2, Guide to Regulation, 35-36.
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unintended market effects or lead to speculative behaviour which would not be in the national
interest. Where the Prime Minister grants an exemption, the agency will not be deemed as
non-compliant with the RIS requirements.12
2) Election commitments: A RIS covering matters which were the subject of an election commitment
will not be required to consider a range of policy options. Only the specific election commitment
need be the subject of regulatory impact assessment and in this situation, the focus should be on
the commitment and the manner in which the commitment should be implemented.
3) Carve-outs: As detailed in the 2016 Guidance Note by the OBPR on Carve-Outs,13 a carve-out is
a standing agreement between the OBPR and a department, removing the need for a preliminary
assessment to be sent to the OBPR for minor or recurrent certain types of regulatory reforms.
Examples of acceptable carve outs include: routine indexation that uses a well-established
formula, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI); routine indexation of aged care subsidies in
line with increases in the CPI; and regularly updating of the listing and price of medicines
available under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.14
Finally, in relation to this brief overview of the RIS Framework,15 an additional central pillar of
ensuring transparency in regulatory practice by the Federal Government and its agencies is the
post-implementation review (PIR). As highlighted in the OBPR’s 2016 Post-Implementation Reviews
Guidance Note (p 1),16, Australian Government agencies need to undertake a PIR for all regulatory
changes that have major impacts on the economy.17
PIRs also need to be prepared when regulation has been introduced, removed, or significantly
changed without a regulation impact statement (RIS).18 This may be because a compliant RIS was not
prepared for the final decision, or because the Prime Minister granted an exemption from the RIS
requirements. A PIR may also be required where the analysis presented to policy makers in the form
of a RIS at the final decision point sufficiently diverges from best practice. In turn, a PIR’s conclusion
should provide an assessment, based on the available evidence, of whether the regulation remains
appropriate and of how effective and efficient it has been in meeting its original objectives.19
12 Where a Prime Minister’s exemption is granted, agencies are still required to quantify the cost of the regulation and identify
offsets and provide those costings to OBPR within three months of the decision. Once costings are agreed they should be sent
to the relevant portfolio Minister and the Prime Minister. The OBPR will also publish the costing information on the OBPR’s
website together with the fact that a Prime Minister’s exemption was granted. See Australian Government, n 2, Guide to
Regulation, 35.
13 Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Best Practice and Regulation, Guidance
Note: Carve-Outs (1 February 2016) 1-3.
14 Office of Best Practice and Regulation, n 13, Guidance Note: Carve-Outs. Guidance Note contains a table of the carve-outs
issued at that time, 4-23.
15 For a more detailed discussion refer to: Sue Taylor, Anthony Asher and Julie-Anne Tarr, Sharpening Regulation in the
Australian Superannuation Industry to Ensure Compatibility of Public and Private Objectives (Paper presented at the 7th
Annual Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference, Monash University, 15 March 2016)
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2720157>.
16 Australian Government, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Guidance Note:
Post-Implementation Reviews (February 2016) <https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/017_
Post-implementation_reviews_0.pdf>.
17 This requirement applies to both Standard and Long Form RISs.
18 The Office of Best Practice Regulation’s (OBPR), (Post-Implementation Reviews: Required Report, as at March 2016,
highlights a total of 92 PIRs have been required under the Australian Government’s PIR requirements. To date, 46 PIRs have
been completed and published on the OBPR website, while there are a further 30 instances where the regulation has been
implemented and a PIR still requires completion, and, in five instances, the relevant measure has not yet been implemented.
Eleven PIRs are currently non-compliant as they were not completed in the required timeframe (at p 1).
19 As noted in the 2016 Post-Implementation Review Guidance Note (at p 1), stakeholder consultation is essential and is a key
part of a PIR. Within this context, a PIR should outline the original problem and the government’s objectives, provide evidence
about impacts of the regulation, analyse the impacts, present findings from consultations, and make a conclusion. The impact
analysis for a PIR should include information about the actual impacts of the regulation, including the regulatory costs.
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THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Australia’s RIS process has its foundations in the agreement by all OECD member countries to ensure
that regulations are of high quality and fit-for-purpose.
The financial and economic crisis of 2008 has reinforced the need and highlighted the importance of a
well-functioning regulatory framework for transparent and efficient markets with the right incentives. Fair,
transparent and clear regulatory frameworks serve also as a sine qua non basic condition for dealing
effectively with environmental and social challenges in a society. Good regulatory practices and institutions
can also help address global challenges and “harness” globalisation through more coherent and shared
rules.20
The 2012 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance (p 1)21
recommends that OECD member countries “commit at the highest political level to an explicit
whole-of-government policy for regulatory quality”. Within this context, Recommendation Four
within this document (p 4) highlights the importance of:
integrating Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) into the early stages of the policy process for the
formulation of new regulatory proposals. Clearly identify policy goals, and evaluate if regulation is
necessary and how it can be most effective and efficient in achieving those goals.
Thus, RIA within its cost-benefit context, provides a framework for analysing information in a
logical and consistent way and assists policymakers to determine which policy most effectively and
efficiently achieves a stated objective or to prioritise the most beneficial of a suite of potential policy
options. In addition, a well-functioning RIA system can foster integrity and trust in the
regulation-making system through increased levels of transparency and accountability by disclosing
the development process of the regulation.
As highlighted by Rose and Walker22 cost-benefit analysis ranks among the most important
decision-making tools in the modern regulatory state. As early as 1902 in the United States, for
example, Congress required federal agencies to compare costs and benefits of proposed action.23 In
the past 30 years in particular, cost-benefit analysis has become a fundamental part of how federal
agencies in the United States think about and ultimately select regulatory approaches supporting the
concept of deeply embedded support for “the cost-benefit state”.24
The main policy considerations that favour cost-benefit analysis are grouped by Rose and
Walker25 into two main classes. First, “cost-benefit analysis promotes more rational decision-making
and more efficient regulatory actions. Second, when combined with notice-and-comment requirements,
cost-benefit analysis promotes good public governance as a transparent, democratic, and accountable
regulatory methodology”.
In addition, the Business Council of Australia presents a strong case for evidence-based policy
making utilising a cost-benefit framework26 which is supported by the Australian Productivity
Commission.27 For example, the Business Council of Australia28 emphasises that:
In order for government decision-makers to ensure that government policy is generating the maximum
benefit for society, decisions need to be based on robust evidence. Further, that evidence needs to be
20 OECD, Government at a Glance 2015 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 6 July 2015) Ch 8, “Regulatory Governance”, 124.
21 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance (2012) Recommendation One, 4.
22 P Rose and C Walker, The Importance of Cost-benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation (US Chamber’s Centre for Capital
Markets – Competitiveness, March 2013) 3.
23 See, for instance, the River and Harbor Act of 1902, Ch 1079, § 3, 32 Stat 331, 372 (1902).
24 See Cass R Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection (American Bar Association, 2002) p 33.
25 Rose and Walker, n 22, 7.
26 Business Council of Australia, Familiarisation of the Cost Benefit Analysis Framework (Deloitte Access Economics,
September 2012).
27 Australian Government, Productivity Commission, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking (Research Report, Canberra,
2012).
28 Business Council of Australia, Familiarisation of the Cost Benefit Analysis Framework, n 26, 2.
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communicated transparently and in a timely manner to business and the community. Evidence is crucial
to good government policy outcomes because it: helps policymakers work out which policy options are
likely to achieve the best results; and helps in getting policy implemented in circumstances where there
is opposition to it.
Thus, in summary, cost-benefit analysis provides a methodology that keeps regulators focused on
the critical questions such as the actual, quantifiable costs and benefits of the proposed regulation, and
also minimises the risks of unintended consequences. In addition, the use of cost-benefit analysis acts
to protect and enhance agency rulemaking by providing agencies with a “defensible regulatory process
that not only is more efficient, but also is more likely to reduce the need for extensive revisions
following public comments and will protect the agency against challenges to its regulations”.29
These protections are particularly important given that Federal Government agencies, such as the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, wield considerable power but operate outside of the scope
of direct parliamentary oversight. This reality can raise concerns of democratic legitimacy and
accountability.30 Indeed, as Eric Posner has argued, “[t]he purpose of requiring agencies to perform
cost-benefit analysis is not to ensure that regulations are efficient; it is to ensure that elected officials
maintain power over agency regulation”.31 That is, cost-benefit analysis opens the decision-making
process to public comment, and thus encourages the agency to consider the views of experts outside of
the agency and helps mitigate the likelihood of agency capture.32
AUSTRALIA’S REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT (RIS) PROCESS – THE PRACTICE
Notwithstanding the very strong arguments and economic rationale supporting a rigorous RIS process,
and the rhetoric surrounding the AGGR, the reality in relation to its implementation and application is
less than convincing. An Independent Review of the Australian Government’s Regulatory Impact
Analysis Process33 conducted by Mr David Borthwick AO PSM and Mr Robert Milliner, released in
2012, provided a broad overview of the government’s current policy development processes. The
findings were extremely critical of many aspects of the government’s policy development processes,
including the public service, ministers, and adherence to Cabinet processes. For example, the Review
found that there was “considerable dissatisfaction and frustration with the RIS process by all parties:
business and the not-for-profit sector, agencies and ministers and/or their offices”.34
The major criticisms included the fact that there had been 31 Prime Minister’s exemptions from
the RIS process under the Rudd/Gillard Governments. This meant that many major policy decisions,
for example, “the introduction of the Fair Work Act, the establishment of the National Broadband
Network and the banning of the ‘super trawler’ from Australian waters, had not been subject to
scrutiny”. Of concern, the Review Panel highlighted that it had not been in a position to examine the
reasons why particular Prime Ministerial exemptions had been sought or granted, however, “the
reason appears to have more to do with it being expedient to decisions that the Government wanted to
make”.
The extent of the use of Prime Minister’s exemptions can be clearly seen in the statistics provided
within the Annual Reports of the Office of Best Practice Regulation which are available from 2008 to
2014 in a similar format. These reports serve to confirm that there were 38 Prime Minister’s
29 Rose and Walker, n 22, 9.
30 See, eg, Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, “Account Me in: Agencies in Quest of Accountability” (2011) 19 J L & Poly 611, 615.
31 Eric A Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective” (2001) 68 U Chi L
Rev 1137, 1141.
32 US Securities and Exchange Commission, Memorandum: Use of the Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC
Rulemakings (June 2013) 2-5.
33 D Borthwick and R Milliner, Independent Review of the Australian Government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Process (April
2012). Note: This Report is no longer available on any Federal Government website: see D Weight summary, note 34.
34 See also Daniel Weight, Government’s Approach to Policy Development Criticised in Formal Review (12 October 2012)
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2012/October/
Governments_approach_to_policy_development_criticised_in_formal_review>.
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exemptions granted (based on exceptional circumstances) to the RIS process between 2008 and 2014.
In addition, in this same period, there were 48 non-compliant Regulatory Impact Statements, and three
regulatory changes with a substantial or widespread impact on the economy (2014, p 12).35
Three examples will serve to highlight the continued failure of both the Labor and Coalition
Governments to adhere to the RIS process in spite of their public endorsement of the OECD’s view of
its importance “as a systematic approach to critically assessing the positive and negative aspects of
proposed and existing regulations and non-regulatory alternatives”.36
EXAMPLE 1 – NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK
On 7 April 2009, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer Wayne Swan in a Joint Media Release
with the Prime Minister and the Ministers for Finance and for Broadband,37 announced on behalf of
the Rudd Government, the establishment of a new company to build and operate “a new super-fast
National Broadband Network … [to be] … built in partnership with private sector, [which] … will be
the single largest nation building infrastructure project in Australian history … This historic
nation-building investment will help transform the Australian economy and create the jobs and
businesses of the 21st century” (p 1).
In spite of the critical importance of this project to the Australian economy, the Labor
Government elected to eliminate any form of RIS process for the introduction of the National
Broadband Network (NBN)38 even though it had strongly endorsed this framework within the then
current 2007 Best Practice Regulation Handbook (p 1):
An efficient regulatory system is essential to a well-functioning society and economy and depends on
having effective processes and institutions for making and administering regulation in all its forms.
Following the Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, the Australian
Government has enhanced the regulatory framework to improve the analysis applied to regulatory
proposals and hence the quality of regulation.39
That is, and as detailed below,40 on 6 December 2010, the Prime Minister (Kevin Rudd) granted
an exemption from the RIS requirements based on exceptional circumstances. A further exemption
related to the NBN was granted on 28 January 2011 by Prime Minister Julia Gillard also based on
exceptional circumstances.
35 Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Best Practice
Regulation Reports 2013-14; 2012-13; Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2011-2012; and 2010-2011.
36 OECD, n 6, Regulatory Policy in Perspective: A Reader’s Companion to the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015.
37 Wayne Swan MP (Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer), “New National Broadband Network” (Media Release, 7 April 2009)
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/036.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=
&DocType=>.
38 See, eg, then Communications Minister Stephen Conroy MP response in parliamentary debate that “We do not need any more
studies, any more cost-benefit analyses, to know that this is an infrastructure investment that this country is crying out for.”
(23 September 2014): Ben Doherty, “Broadband Call Rejected”, Sydney Morning Herald (13 May 2009)
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/broadband-call-rejected-20090512-b1wh.html>.
39 In a Statement by the then Minister for Finance and Deregulation, the Hon Senator Penny Wong on 28 October 2010 for
reaffirming the independence of the Office of Best Practice Regulation, the Minister also highlighted the Labor Government’s
support for the RIS process:
The Government is firmly committed to improving both the quality of our stock of existing regulation and to ensure
that new regulation is necessary and appropriate for the purpose. An important element is ensuring that proposed
regulations are thoroughly scrutinised so they are introduced only where necessary and at minimum cost to business
and consumers. [To achieve this objective] … the regulatory assessment process we have is world class – in
February 2010 the OECD (p 74) asserted that “Australia is in many respects a model among OECD countries for the
quality of its institutional underpinning for regulatory reform and for the application of reform strategies”.
40 Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Best Practice
Regulation Updates, National Broadband Network Exemptions, <http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/?s=NBN&submit.x=14&submit.y=13>.
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6 December 2010
National Broadband Network Companies Bill 2010, Telecommunications Legislation Amendment
(National Broadband Network Measures – Access Arrangements) Bill 2010 – Department of
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy
On 7 April 2009, the Government announced the establishment of a new company, NBN Co Limited (NBN
Co), to build and operate a new National Broadband Network (NBN). The (then) Prime Minister granted
an exemption from the Regulation Impact Statement requirements on the basis of exceptional
circumstances for that decision, including for the key principles for the governance, ownership and
operating arrangements for the wholesale-only NBN company and for the access regime to facilitate
open access to the NBN for retail level telecommunications service providers.
28 January 2011
Prime Minister’s exemption – Government’s response to the National Broadband Network
Implementation Study – Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy
On December 2010, the Prime Minister Julia Gillard, the Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer Wayne Swan,
the Minister for Finance & Deregulation Senator Penny Wong and the Minister for Broadband,
Communications and the Digital Economy Senator Stephen Conroy, announced the Government’s response
to the National Broadband Network Implementation Study.
Regulation Impact Statements were required for parts of this proposal, but the Prime Minister
granted an exemption on the basis of exceptional circumstances.41
The Australian Broadcasting Commission’s (ABC), The Drum article by David Braue, entitled NBN
Hypocrisy Confirms Contempt for Process,42 detailed the extremely critical reaction of Malcolm
Turnbull MP, the then Shadow Communications Minister within the Coalition shadow cabinet, in
relation to these exemptions:
Labor suffered near continuous browbeating by Turnbull during his nearly three years in opposition,
with him repeatedly questioning the credentials of its management and questioning at every opportunity
Labor’s decision to begin the project without conducting an extensive cost-benefit analysis (CBA). In
October 2009, Turnbull called Labor’s NBN a “no cost-benefit analysis, no financial analysis required,
$43 billion National Broadband Network thought bubble”. A year later, he argued in an SMH editorial
that a CBA was “essential” to ensure that any future NBN would deliver adequate returns to justify the
expenditure of what was then $43 billion for Labor’s fibre-to-the-premise (FTTP) model … In a
parliamentary address on October 26, 2010, Turnbull said: “[The NBN] has been subject to no financial
scrutiny and, remarkably, the government continues to refuse to submit it to a cost-benefit analysis.
Everything we know about good government and prudence tells us that a cost-benefit analysis is
required.” In November 2010, Turnbull said: “It beggars belief that a government could be so reckless
as to allow such a massive investment to proceed without the publication of a business case … and,
above all, without a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.”
The Coalition’s criticisms of the Labor-granted exemptions to the RIS process in relation to the
introduction of the NBN were then also included in the July 2013 policy document, “The Coalition’s
Policy to Boost Productivity and Reduce Regulation” (p 12), the Coalition strongly criticised the
absence of a formal RIS process for the introduction of the NBN based on these Prime Minister’s
exemptions.
Labor has failed to follow its own rules regarding the use of Regulation Impact Statements. Under Labor’s
own rules, government departments and agencies are required to prepare Regulation Impact Statements for
regulatory proposals that are “likely to have a regulatory impact on business or the nor-for-profit sector,
unless that impact is of minor or machinery in nature and does not substantially alter existing arrangements”
… In numerous cases … the Prime Minister has granted an exemption due to alleged exceptional
circumstances without providing justification … Generous use of Prime Ministerial exemptions or outright
non-compliance has meant that Labor’s Cabinet Ministers have made significant regulatory decisions of
national consequence without knowing the political consequence of these decisions.
41 Office of Best Practice Regulation, n 40, Best Practice Regulation Updates, National Broadband Network Exemptions.
42 David Braue, NBN Hypocisy Confirms Contempt for Process (ABC News, The Drum, 14 April 2014)
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-14/braue-nbn-hypocrisy-confirms-contempt-for-process/5384464>.
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Given the stated position repeatedly taken by the Coalition on the importance of the RIS process, and
the constant and very public attacks on the Labor Government for the RIS exemptions it granted, the
next NBN “event” came as a shock to many. That is, on 9 March 2014, the then Minister for the
Department of Communications and the Arts, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, in a speech to the
CommsDay Summit 2014, announced that he had ordered the National Broadband Network Company
to go ahead with the Coalition’s preferred but highly controversial “Multi-Technology Mix” option for
its broadband rollout. This decision was made even though the cost/benefit analysis previously
established by the Coalition into the project had not been completed.43
This decision led to a range of articles highlighting the inconsistency of such a decision44 which
was best summarised by the ABC’s The Drum article:
the Abbott Government [has engaged] in unconscionable hypocrisy about its planned expenditure of
$41 billion without appropriate oversight … The hypocrisy revolves around Communications Minister
Malcolm Turnbull’s decision to issue a new Statement of Expectations (SoE) to NBN Co, the company
charged with rolling out the next-generation broadband network. In doing so, Turnbull has completely
changed the architectural and strategic direction of the NBN – without waiting for the results of the
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that he commissioned in December … to guide his decision about the best
path forward for the project.45
The Coalition’s decision was made within the context of the existence of both the Liberal Party’s
Charter of Budget Honesty (1996) (Charter) and the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO)46 which was
established on 23 July 2012. This Charter and PBO had previously been highlighted in the 8 October
2009 Turnbull Joint Conference with Hockey and Coonan “The Coalition’s Plan to Pay Off Labor’s
Debt”47 as having the potential to:
ensure honesty, real honesty and accountability in public finances. Now that is a great Liberal Party
tradition. We established the Charter of Budget Honesty in 1996 – an enormous breakthrough in terms
of true accountability for budget outcomes. But what we also must do now is take a second step and
establish a Parliamentary Budget Office which will operate like the Congressional Budget Office in the
United States and provide a genuine, independent, expert economic analytical review of government
spending and policies in exactly the way the Congressional Budget Office does in America … A
Parliamentary Budget Office would be a real disincentive for governments to engage in [the Labor] kind
of reckless spending.48
Example 2 – Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) licensing
The Superannuation Safety Amendment Act 2004 (SSA Act) and the Superannuation Industry
(Supervision) Amendment Regulations (2004), No 113, were designed to provide superannuation fund
members with a safer, more competitive and best practice investment environment. The core of this
protective framework was the formal licensing of both trustees and superannuation funds as part of the
Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) reforms. This licensing regime, which was described “as the
43 Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, Speech delivered at the CommsDay Summit 2014 (9 March 2014)
<http://www.minister.communications.gov.au/malcolm_turnbull/speeches/commsday#.VyWg7r7GCt>.
44 Renai LeMay, “Hypocrisy: Turnbull Approves MTM NBN Without Cost/Benefit Analysis”, Delimeter (9 April 2014)
<https://delimiter.com.au/2014/04/09/hypocrisy-turnbull-approves-mtm-nbn-without-costbenefit-analysis/>.
45 Braue, n 42.
46 The Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) was established on 23 July 2012. The role of the PBO is to inform the Parliament by
providing independent and non-partisan analysis of the budget cycle, fiscal policy and the financial implications of proposals.
See Parliament of Australia, as detailed on the PBO site, <http://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/
parliamentary_budget_office>.
47 Parliament of Australia, Transcript of Turnbull Joint Press Conference with Hockey and Coonan – the Coalition’s Plan to Pay
Off Labor’s Debt (8 October 2009) <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;
query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FY0WU6%22>.
48 As at 30 June 2015, the two PIRs related to the “decisions in response to the establishment of the National Broadband
Network” and “decisions in response to NBN Implementation Review” were classed as non-compliant by the OBPR due to
non-completion of PIRs within the required time-frames from the implementation dates. As at 19 May 2016, the OBPR has
accepted that the relevant PIRs have been submitted and accepted as compliant.
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catalyst for far-reaching change”,49 was implemented for all superannuation funds regulated by the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) by 2006 and included “substantial additional
requirements for RSE licensees, including specific license conditions relating to the governance and
risk management of the RSE licensee’s business operations”.50
APRA viewed these licensing requirements as necessary given that:
the compulsory nature of superannuation means that the failure of the market to deliver optimal
outcomes for superannuation impacts on almost all superannuation fund members. In a system of
mandatory retirement savings where members must be part of the system, RSE licensees and
superannuation regulators have an increasing obligation to ensure that confidence in the system is
maintained.51
However, in spite of the predicted major impacts of the RSE reforms within the superannuation
industry, the RIS prepared for the SSA Act, which amended the Superannuation Industry (Supervision)
Act 1993 (SIS Act) to permit APRA to license superannuation funds, included no quantitative analysis
for either the costs or benefits associated with the regulatory reforms.52 Moreover, in reference to the
SSA Act Regulations, the Office of Regulation Review (a predecessor of the OBPR) advised that a
RIS was not required. This “carve-out” exemption was provided on the basis that the measures
contained in the proposed Regulations “have either been adequately addressed in the RIS for the SSA
Act or are of a minor or machinery of government nature”.53
Superannuation (Supervision) Amendment Regulations 2004 (No 3) 2004 No 113
Explanatory Statement – Statutory Rules 2004 No 113
Statutory Rules 2004 No – Issued by authority of the Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer – Subject
– Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 – Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment
Regulations 2004 (No 3)
… Superannuation Safety Amendment Act 2004 (the SSA Act) amends the SIS Act from 1 July 2004. Among
other things, the SIS Act is amended to provide for the licensing of trustees of APRA-regulated
superannuation entities … The primary purpose of licensing superannuation trustees is to ensure that all
superannuation trustees are honest and competent and have appropriate risk management arrangements,
resources and outsourcing arrangements to look after the interests of members and beneficiaries of
superannuation entities. Licensing will be conducted by APRA.
The Office of Regulation Review has advised that a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) is not required
for the proposed Regulations, as the measures contained in the proposed Regulations have either been
adequately addressed in the RIS for the SSA Act or are of a minor or machinery of government
nature.
Authority: Subsection 353(1) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993.54
The RIS for the Superannuation Safety Amendment Act 2004, however only related to the mechanics
of the reform and there was no quantitative analysis for either the costs or benefits associated with the
regulatory reforms. This regulatory incursion into the superannuation market has, however, had a
substantial and widespread impact. Various commentators predicted that these changes would
“undoubtedly impact on individuals in those [exiting] funds, and, in some instances, force well run
49 M Taylor, “Trustee Licensing – the Big Issue”, Super Review (10 January 2006).
50 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Regulation Impact Statement, OBPR ID: 14155, Prudential Standards (2012) 3.
51 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Annual Regulatory Plan – APRA 2012-2013,
52 Superannuation Safety Amendment Bill 2003, Explanatory Memorandum, Regulatory Impact Statement at 2002-2003.
53 See Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment Regulations 2004 (No 3) No 113, Explanatory Statement – Statutory
Rules 2004 No 113.
54 See Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment Regulations 2004 (No 3) No 113, Explanatory Statement – Statutory
Rules 2004 No 113.
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funds to exit and reduce the diversity within the industry”.55 This prediction was supported by the
statistics which showed that the number of RSE funds has decreased dramatically from roughly 1,800
in June 2004 to 258 funds in December 2015.56
Thus, the licensing regime was introduced without any form of detailed, statistical, cost-benefit
analysis being undertaken. In addition, given the wording of the exemption stated above, the carve-out
provisions applied in this case also allowed the SSA Act Regulations to be exempted from any form of
post-implementation review. This “weak-form” treatment of the RSE licensing regime reforms stands
in stark contrast to the statistical reality of the actual impacts of RSE licensing.57
Example 3 – the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms
As highlighted in the Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011,58 the
fundamental policy settings of the Australian financial services regulation regime reflect the principles
underpinning the 1997 Financial System Inquiry Report (known as the Wallis Report), which were
based on “a belief that markets drive efficiency and that regulatory intervention should be kept to a
minimum to allow markets to achieve maximum efficiency. [This belief then] … shaped both the
financial services regulation regime and ASIC’s role and powers”.
However, as a result of a significant number of financial product and service provider collapses,59
the Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC) in its 2009 inquiry, reviewed this regulatory process. The
final, PJC Report included 11 recommendations,60 which included “that the Corporations Act be
amended to explicitly include a fiduciary duty for financial advisers operating under an Australian
Financial Services Licence, requiring them to place their clients’ interests ahead of their own … and
that the Corporations Act be amended to require advisers to disclose more prominently in marketing
material restrictions on the advice they are able to provide consumers and any potential conflicts of
interest”.
Of fundamental concern to the PJC was that the existing regulatory regime was failing to protect
consumers from poor financial advice and its consequences given that:
55 R Clare, “Benefits and Costs of the Regulation of Superannuation” (ASFA 2006 National Conference and Super Expo “Going
the Distance”, Perth Convention Centre, 2006).
56 APRA, Insight Issue One 2015 <http://www.apra.gov.au/Insight/Pages/Insight-Issue-One-2015-HTML.aspx>.
57 Although statistics do show that the decline in fund numbers began before the introduction of the licensing requirements,
anecdotal evidence obtained in a 2006 trustee survey found many trustees’ decided to “exit” the industry prior to 2004 rather
than comply with the additional licensing requirements. Reduction in fund number may also be due in part to regulatory changes
outside the licensing regime, with this uncertainty underlining the need for a PIR to investigate this significant reduction in the
diversity of the industry. S Taylor and A Asher, “Regulatory Capture and Overload in the Australian Superannuation Industry
over the Last Decade: Trustees’ Views and a Cost/Benefit Analysis” (Paper presented to the 21st Annual Colloquium of
Superannuation Researchers, Sydney, July 2013).
58 Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 (Bills Digest No 72, 2011-12, 8 November 2011) 2-3.
59 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into Financial
Products and Services in Australia (Canberra, November 2009), Chapter One, 1. Chapter 3 of the PJC Report addresses the
collapse of Storm Financial. The collapse of Opus Prime is addressed in Ch 4 of the report.
60 The following recommendations were considered most relevant in the context of the Bill and the commentary provided in the
Bills Digest:
Recommendation 1: that the Corporations Act be amended to explicitly include a fiduciary duty for financial advisers operating
under an AFSL, requiring them to place their clients’ interests ahead of their own;
Recommendation 3: that the Corporations Act be amended to require advisers to disclose more prominently in marketing
material restrictions on the advice they are able to provide consumers and any potential conflicts of interest;
Recommendation 6: that s 920A of the Corporations Act be amended to provide extended powers for ASIC to ban individuals
from the financial services industry;
Recommendation 8: that ss 913B and 915C of the Corporations Act be amended to allow ASIC to deny an application, or
suspend or cancel a licence, where there is a reasonable belief that the licensee “may not comply” with their obligations under
the licence; and
Recommendation 11: that ASIC develop and deliver more effective education activities targeted to groups in the community who
are likely to be seeking financial advice for the first time.
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The financial advice industry has significant structural tensions that are central to the debate about
conflicts of interest and their effect on the advice consumers receive. On one hand, clients seek out
financial advisers to obtain professional guidance on the investment decisions that will serve their
interests, particularly with a view to maximising retirement income. On the other hand, financial
advisers act as a critical distribution channel for financial product manufacturers, often through
vertically integrated business models or the payment of commissions and other remuneration-based
incentives.61
In response to these PJC recommendation, on 26 April 2010, the then Labor Minister for
Financial Services, Superannuation and Corporate Law, Chris Brown MP, announced that reforms
would be introduced within the financial advice industry which were designed to:
tackle conflicts of interest that have threatened the quality of financial advice that has been provided to
Australian investors, and the mis-selling of financial products … These reforms will see Australian
investors receive financial advice that is in their best interests, rather than being directed to products as
a result of incentives or commissions offered to the financial adviser. ASIC’s powers to act against
unscrupulous operators will also be strengthened and professional standards for advisers will be
reviewed by an expert advisory panel.62
Within this context, the Labor Government introduced the Corporations Amendment (Future of
Financial Advice) Act 2012 and the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice
Measures) Act 2012 (the FoFA Acts) which amended the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to implement
the Future of Financial Advice reforms (FoFA Reforms). These legislative reforms known as FoFA 1
and FoFA 2, which were subject to strong opposition by the Financial Services Sector,63 introduced a
range of investor protections. These included64 a prospective ban on conflicted remuneration,65
structures including commissions and volume based payments arising from a range of retail
investment products, and a duty for financial advisers to act in the best interests of their clients subject
to a “reasonable steps” qualification.66
Of importance to note, significant aspects of the RISs prepared for these FoFA 1 and FoFA2
legislative reforms were ruled by the OBPR as not adequate as detailed below.67 Thus, the OBPR
assessed the regulatory proposals as non-compliant.
61 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, n 59, Inquiry into
Financial Products and Services in Australia, para 5.6.
62 Chris Bowen MP, Minister for Financial Services, Superannuation and Corporate Law, Overhaul of Financial Advice (Media
Release No 036, 26 April, 2010) <http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/036.htm
&pageID=&min=ceba&Year=&DocType=0>.
63 Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2014 (Bills Digest No 11 2014-15) “Position of
Major Interest Groups” <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd1415a/15bd011>; Choice,
“‘CONbank’ Says Sorry But Consumer Protections Must Go” (Media Release, 3 July 2015)
<https://www.choice.com.au/about-us/media-releases/2014/july/conbank-says-but-consumer-protections-must-go>.
64 Australian Securities and Investments and Commission, FoFA – Background and Implementation,
<http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/future-of-financial-advice-reforms/fofa-background-and-implementation/>.
65 Section 963A, under Div 4 of Pt 7.7A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), provides the following definition of conflicted
remuneration: Conflicted remuneration means any benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, given to a financial services
licensee, or a representative of a financial services licensee, who provides financial product advice to persons as retail clients
that, because of the nature of the benefit or the circumstances in which it is given:
(a) could reasonably be expected to influence the choice of financial product recommended by the licensee or representative
to retail clients; or
(b) could reasonably be expected to influence the financial product advice given to retail clients by the licensee or
representative.
66 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and New Zealand, Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) Reforms
<http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/Industry-Topics/Financial-advisory-services/FoFA>.
67 Department of Finance and Deregulation, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Non-compliance with Best Practice Regulation
Requirements – Future of Financial Advice 2011 – Treasury (8 August 2011) <http://ris.finance.gov.au/2011/08/08/non-
compliance-with-best-practice-regulation-requirements-%e2%80%93-future-of-
financial-advice-2011-%e2%80%93-treasury-2/>.
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8 August 2011
Non-compliance with best practice regulation requirements – Future of Financial Advice 2011 – Treasury
On 28 April 2011
the Assistant Treasurer announced a number of reforms following on from the Future of Financial Advice
announcement in April 2010. The reforms include: banning all trailing commissions on risk insurance inside
superannuation; a requirement for financial advisers to get clients to “opt-in” every two years; a broad ban
on volume-based payments from product issuers to financial advisors; allowance for scaled rather than
holistic financial advice by the industry; and a ban on any soft-dollar benefits from product issuers to
advisors above $300 (with certain exclusions).
An adequate Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) was prepared on the broad ban on volume based payments
from product issuers to financial advisers under the previous best practice regulation guidelines and is
required to be published upon tabling of the regulations. RISs were prepared for the various other
reforms but were not assessed as adequate for the decision-making stage. Consequently, the OBPR has
assessed the proposal as being non-compliant with the Australian Government’s best practice
regulation requirements.68
In the dissenting report by the Coalition Members of the PJC Inquiry,69 it was noted that:
in pursuing regulatory changes, government must rigorously assess increasing costs and red tape for
both business and consumers. It is incumbent on the government to conduct a proper regulatory impact
assessment to a standard which is consistent with its own best practice regulation requirements.
Coalition members of the Committee assert that such an adequate regulatory impact assessment is
necessary to properly assess the impact of FOFA on businesses, consumers and the wider economy.
According to the government’s own Office of Best Practice Regulation the government did not have
adequate information before it to assess the impact of FOFA on business and consumers or to assess the
cost/benefit of the proposed changes. This is highly unsatisfactory given the complexity and costs
associated with the contentious parts of the proposed FOFA changes.70
The pre-implementation lobbying against these FoFA laws by the Financial Services Sector and
the related concerns raised in the Dissenting Report by the Coalition Members was seen as the catalyst
for the major amendments which were subsequently introduced by the returning Coalition
Government. To give effect to these reforms, on 19 March 2014, the Corporations Amendment
(Streamlining of Future Financial Advice) Bill 2014 outlined a variety of changes designed to
implement the Coalition Government’s election commitment to reduce compliance costs and the
regulatory burden on the Financial Services Sector. While these amendments were passed by the
House of Representatives on 28 August 2014, they were disallowed by the Senate on 19 November
2014 following widespread controversy.71
68 Office of Best Practice Regulation, n 67, Non-compliance with Best Practice Regulation Requirements – Future of Financial
Advice 2011 – Treasury.
69 Parliament of Australia, Dissenting Report by Coalition Members of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services, 153-154 <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_
Financial_Services/Completed_inquiries/2010-13/future_fin_advice/report/d01>.
70 For example, in the Association of Financial Advisers (AFA) – Submission to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee –
Proposed FoFA Reforms (27 January 2012) 8-9, it was highlighted that the Future of Financial Advice Bill (the FoFA Bill):
“introduced into Parliament yesterday by the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, Bill Shorten, will, according
to Rice Warner Research as cited in the Explanatory Memorandum (EM), almost halve the number of advisers operating in the
industry by 2024, cut adviser revenue by $2.5 billion and change the fundamental characteristics of people providing advice to
everyday Australians”.
71 For example, both CPA Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia were troubled by the prospect of a return
to commissions – a specific payment in return for a specific sale, usually directly from a third party. They were strongly of the
view that “all commissions have the potential for real and perceived conflicts of interest and should therefore be removed”. In
their view the proposal: … to loosen this ban and permit commissions on general advice not only undermines the principles of
the FoFA reforms, they return to encouraging a sales culture in the industry rather than focusing on provision of quality personal
advice…“Therefore it is imperative that conflicted remuneration structures, especially those usually aligned with sales, are
removed” – refer to Parliament of Australia, Senate Standing Committees on Economics, Corporations Amendment
(Streamlining of Future Finance Advice) Bill 2014, Ch 6, “Conflicted Remuneration”, para 6.20,
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/FOFA/Report/c06>.
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Again of note, and in spite of the Coalition’s previous statement that “It is incumbent on the
government to conduct a proper regulatory impact assessment to a standard which is consistent with
its own best practice regulation requirements”, serious issues arose in relation to the flawed RIS
process adopted. That is, within the Amendments put forward by the Coalition, the “Details-stage
Regulation Impact Statement” prepared by the Department of the Treasury and submitted to the OBPR
on 19 March 2014, reported that:
The key reforms … are estimated to produce average ongoing compliance cost savings of around
$190 million per year as well as once-off implementation cost savings of around $88 million … Overall,
the measures were assessed as having a major impact on the broader economy and therefore given a B
rating (on a scale of A to D) in relation to the level of analysis required.72
This RIS prepared by the Department of the Treasury, given that it related to an election
commitment by the Coalition Government to reduce regulatory burdens and costs in the Financial
Services Sector, contained no alternative policy options. This incomplete RIS, as set out below, was
then assessed as adequate by the OBPR.73
13 January 2014 – Future of Financial Advice Amendments – Options-stage Regulation Impact
Statement – Department of the Treasury
The Government has made a commitment to reduce the regulatory burden on businesses, community
organisations and individuals. On 20 December 2013 the Government announced changes to the regulation
of the financial products and services sector, with the aim of reducing the regulatory burden for the financial
advice sector.
… The reforms are expected to have major impacts on the sector. These impacts include estimated average
ongoing compliance cost savings of around $191 million per year, as well as once-off implementation cost
savings of around $88 million.
An options-stage RIS has been prepared by the Department of the Treasury to facilitate consultation.
As the proposal relates to an election commitment, alternative options have not been considered. The
options-stage RIS has been certified by the Department of the Treasury.74
However, the prepared RIS did not quantify any benefit or costs for consumers. This information was
available in a detailed Rice Warner 2013 Report which identified that the benefits to consumers were
more than twice that of the cost to industry over the next 15 years. In total, the benefits of the original,
Labor initiated, FoFA reforms were estimated to be $6.8 billion, far exceeding the cost of $2.4 billion
over the next 15 years. Modelling of the FoFA reforms also highlighted benefits in addition to the
savings to super members and consumers of financial products. That is, Rice Warner predicted that, by
2027, the FoFA reforms would: boost Australians’ savings under advice by $144 billion; reduce the
average cost of advice from $2,046 (before the reforms) to $1,163, and double the provision of
financial advice from 893,000 pieces to 1.88 million pieces.
Thus, the cost-based only RIS prepared by Treasury to support the Coalition’s Amendments to the
FoFA laws was inconsistent with the guidelines in the then current, July 2013 Best Practice
Regulation Handbook. That is, the Options Stage RIS does not provide rigorous evidence based
assessment of the proposals. The handbook states that where:
regulations are necessary for the proper functioning of society and the economy, the challenge for
government is to deliver regulation that is effective in addressing an identified problem … and efficient
72 Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Future of Financial
Advice Amendments – Details-stage of Regulation Impact Statement – Department of the Treasury (19 March 2014)
<http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/2014/03/19/future-of-financial-advice-amendments-details-stage-regulation-impact-statement-
department-of-the-treasury/>.
73 Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Future of Financial
Advice Amendments – Options-stage Regulation Impact Statement – Department of the Treasury (13 January 2014)
<http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/2014/01/13/future-of-financial-advice-amendments-options-stage-regulation-impact-statement-
department-of-the-treasury/>.
74 Office of Best Practice Regulation, n 73, Future of Financial Advice Amendments – Options-stage Regulation Impact
Statement – Department of the Treasury.
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in maximising the benefits to the community, taking account of the costs. Determining whether
regulation meets the goals of effectiveness and efficiency requires a structured approach to policy
development that systematically evaluates costs and benefits.75
CONCLUSIONS
The RIS process, fully implemented, does have the potential to achieve the Australian Government’s
avowed intention of “better regulation, not more regulation”.76 By forcing policy makers to provide a
detailed, transparent economics-based analysis of both the costs and the benefits of any proposed
regulatory reform, the RIS process allows the legislature, potentially affected organisations and
individuals, and the wider community, to assess its likely impact against viable alternatives in a
transparent and accountable way. Moreover, RISs can be used as a means to provide governments with
a tool that enables the more effective control of specialised agencies, to which important government
tasks must be delegated,77 but without the need for the centre of government to acquire the same level
of specialised knowledge as their agents.78
Thus, in summary, the RIS process has the potential to reduce the negative impacts of special
interest group lobbying and/or political expediency as a result of three important features: it is
comprehensive, requiring the examination of a wide range of regulatory effects; it is standardised and
supported by professional norms; and it improves transparency by publishing for public scrutiny
relevant agency estimates of regulatory effects.79
While the benefits of RISs and the cost-benefit analysis inherent in this process have been
strongly supported in this article, it is recognised that the process is not a universal panacea to
problems associated with regulatory reform. For example, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 2010 (the “Dodd Frank Act”) required more than 400 different rulemakings from
various Federal Government agencies to implement its wide ranging regulatory reforms. Business-
based petitioners used cost-benefit analysis requirements to oppose the implementation of many new
rules and regulations, as “arbitrary and capricious”, successfully arguing that a proposed Securities
Exchange Commission rule should be struck down as the SEC had not sufficiently considered the
impact of the rule on capital markets and that its cost/benefit analysis “relied upon insufficient
empirical data” and ignored “commentator’s that reached the opposite result”.80 While cost-benefit
analysis has been described as the villain in this exercise as grounding a Trojan horse strategy,81 this
case says more about the adequacy of the cost-benefit analysis used to support or motivate the
regulatory reform measure.
In the authors’ view, firstly, for the RIS process in Australia to more fully achieve the intended
outcomes espoused in the AGGR, it will be necessary to significantly restrict the allowable carve-out
and exemption provisions. To achieve this objective, the legislature needs to more clearly elaborate the
critically important RIS threshold concepts such as “minor or machinery in nature” and “does not
75 As at the 13 January 2014, the July 2013 version of the Best Practice Regulation Handbook was in place. This Handbook was
then replaced in March 2014 by the Australian Government Guide to Regulation
<http://rogerscarlisle.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Fed%20obpr-handbook%20July%202013.pdf>.
76 Australian Government, n 2, Guide to Regulation, 3; Statement by the Honourable Josh Frydenberg MP, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Prime Minister.
77 OECD, n 20, Government at a Glance 2015, 20.
78 Posner, n 31, 1141.
79 D Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture”, in D Carpenter and D Moss (eds) Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special
Interest Influence and How to Limit It (The Tobin Project, Harvard Law School, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 437.
80 Business Roundtable v SEC 647 F3d 1144, 1150 (DC Cir 2011). See Michael W Stocker and Philip C Smith, “Requiring SEC
to Perform Economic Analysis Hinders Financial Reform”, New York Journal (17 December 2012); John Kemp, The Trojan
Horse of Cost Benefit Analysis (Reuters, 3 January 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/column-finance-
regulation- idUSL6E8C31UN20120103>.
81 Kemp, n 80.
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substantially alter existing arrangements”. As set out by the 2012 Regulatory Impact Analysis
Benchmarking Report by the Productivity Commission,82 a number of stakeholders identified
regulatory proposals with significant impacts that were bypassing this process:
Of greatest concern, however, is the perception that in some jurisdictions proposals (often politically
contentious) with highly significant impacts are more likely not to be subjected to adequate RIA than
other less significant proposals, either because: they are more likely to be granted an exemption from
the process by the Prime Minister, Premier, Treasurer or relevant delegated officer.
The concerns raised by the Productivity Commission had previously been identified in the 2006
Banks Taskforce Report83 which stated that:
RIA compliance has tended to be lowest for more significant or controversial regulations, where good
process is most needed. It also noted that in many cases, RISs appear to have been an afterthought,
merely justifying decisions already taken. It concluded that RIS requirements needed to be strengthened
to reflect the analytical and consultation requirements.
The OPBR had sought to address these criticisms by the release of its updated 2014 AGGR,
however, the carve out provisions remain in place if the regulatory impact is of a minor or machinery
nature and therefore this does not substantially alter the position from that which existed before the
release of the updated Guide. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s exemption remains as does the reduced
RIS focus in relation to election commitments. Of concern in relation to the use of these carve-outs
and Prime Minister’s exemptions, and as detailed in part three of this article, there is often a
significant disconnect between these RIS exemptions and the statistical reality of the actual impacts of
the non-compliant legislative reforms introduced, for example, in relation to RSE licensing.
Secondly, we support the view put forward in the 2012 Independent Review of the Australian
Government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Process,84 conducted by Borthwick and Milliner, that more
needs to be done to increase the capacity of regulatory agencies to effectively develop and implement
policy including in terms of the preparation of RISs. Within their Review, the authors stated that:
too many agencies claim that they lack the skills and resources to undertake analysis required by a RIS.
If so, this seems to the Review extraordinary … a RIS should hardly be onerous to an agency which
should know its business.… To make up for such perceived shortcomings in capacity and capability, all
too often agencies have resorted to employing consultants. … Of course, consultants have their place,
but agencies should have the expertise themselves – or be able to access it with proper planning – to
define the problem and analyse the options. Admissions to the contrary – if they have any validity – do
not reflect well on the state of regulatory policy capability of agencies.
Finally, and in a world where “honest and responsive governments” is one of the most
widely-cited priorities of people from around the world,85 the authors strongly endorse the views
expressed within the Productivity Commission’s 2012 Report86 that:
RIS documents should not be delivered to the door of executive government to inform decisions and
then disappear. RIA processes are less about giving a single answer, and more about framing problems,
scoping solutions and uncovering unintended consequences of proposed regulatory measures. A RIS
should not fade from the scene once a regulatory decision enters parliament, but should remain an
important reference point in political negotiations in the parliament before final decisions are taken. In
short, RIA processes should not only better inform executive government decisions; they should also
better inform the decisions of Australian parliaments.
82 Productivity Commission, n 27, 62-63.
83 Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, Rethinking Regulation (January 2006) i and ii (Banks Taskforce
Report) <http://www.regulationtaskforce.gov.au/finalreport>.
84 Borthwick and Milliner, n 33.
85 Beyond 2015 Legacy, World We Want 2015, <http://www.beyond2015.org/world-we-want-2015>.
86 Productivity Commission, n 27, 236.
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APPENDIX ONE: A STYLISED SCHEMATIC OF THE REGULATORY IMPACT
STATEMENT PROCESS
Source:
Productivity Commission, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking Research Report (Novem-
ber 2012) 12.
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